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Kant's Theory of Punishment
THOM BROOKS
University of Sheffield
The most widespread interpretation amongst contemporary theorists of Kant's theory
of punishment is that it is retributivist. On the contrary, I will argue there are very
different senses in which Kant discusses punishment. He endorses retribution for moral
law transgressions and consequentialist considerations for positive law violations.
When these standpoints are taken into consideration, Kant's theory of punishment
is more coherent and unified than previously thought. This reading uncovers a new
problem in Kant's theory of punishment. By assuming a potential offender's intentional
disposition as Kant does without knowing it for certain, we further exacerbate the
opportunity for misdiagnosis - although the assumption of individual criminal cul-
pability may be all we can reasonably be expected to use. While this difficulty is not lost
on Kant, it continues to remain with us today, making Kant's theory of punishment far
more relevant than previously thought.
The duty of philosophy was, rather, to remove the deception arising from
misrepresentation, even at the cost of destroying the most highly extolled and
cherished delusion.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason1
Here, then, we see philosophy put in fact in a precarious position, which is
to be firm even though there is nothing in heaven or on earth from which it
depends or on which it is based.
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals'1
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most striking illustration of a retributivist position, in this case
one that appears to be entirely backward-looking and oblivious to conse-
quences, is found in ... Immanuel Kant.3
This may well be the most widespread interpretation of Kant's theory
of punishment amongst contemporary theorists. Most commentators
today would disagree with any suggestion that Kant's theory is open
to consequentialist considerations.4 On the contrary, I will demon-
1
 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. W. S. Pluhar, Indianapolis,
[1781/1787] 1996, p. 9 [Axiii].
2
 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. M. J.
Gregor, Cambridge, 1991, p. 35 [4:425]. When citing all works by Kant except the
Critique of Pure Reason, the first number will refer to the page in the edition cited. In
the brackets, the first number refers to the volume number of the Prussian Academy of
Sciences edition of Kant's works with the second number after the colon referring to the
page number in this volume where the quotation is found. Unless stated otherwise, all
uses of emphasis in citations are given.
3
 Mark Tunick, 'Is Kant a Retributivist?' History of Political Thought, xvii (1996),
p. 60.
4
 See H. B. Ashton, Kant's Moral Philosophy, London, 1970; Richard Brandt, Ethical
© Edinburgh University Press 2003 Utilitas Vol. 15, No. 2, July 2003
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strate that Kant's theory of punishment is not purely retributive.6
I believe that much of the reason for interpretative confusion is due
to the very different senses in which Kant speaks of punishment
regarding moral and positive law. When these standpoints are taken
into consideration, I believe Kant's theory of punishment is more
coherent and unified than previously thought.
I will argue that Kant's writings often justify punishments for
transgressions of positive law on non-retributive grounds. This
interpretation is contrary to most of the scholarship in the field. The
confusion lies for the most part with Kant's retributive concerns
regarding violations of the moral law, in my view. Most commentators
seem to understand the plentiful discussions of punishments for
transgressing moral law as either Kant's entire theory of punishment
Theory, Englewood Cliffs, 1959, pp. 496-8; Richard Dean, 'Cummiskey's Kantian
Consequentialism', Utilitas, xii (2000); Samuel Fleischacker, 'Kant's Theory of
Punishment', Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. H. Williams, Cardiff, 1992;
Katrin Flikschuh, 'On Kant's Rechtslehre', European Journal of Philosophy, v (1997);
Mary J. Gregor, Laws of Freedom: A Study of Kant's Method of Applying the Categorical
Imperative in the Metaphysik der Sitten, Oxford, 1963; Jean Hampton, Political
Philosophy, Boulder, 1997, pp. 134 f., 147,175; Sarah Williams Holtman, 'Toward Social
Reform: Kant's Penal Theory Reinterpreted', Utilitas, ix (1997); Conrad D. Johnson,
'The Authority of the Moral Agent', Consequentialism and its Critics, ed. S. Scheffler,
Oxford, 1988, p. 273; Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends,
Cambridge, 1996; Jeffrie G. Murphy, 'Kant's Theory of Criminal Punishment',
Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress, ed. L. W. Beck, Dordrecht, 1972,
p. 434; Edmund L. Pincoffs, The Rationale of Legal Punishment, Atlantic Highlands,
1966, p. 9; Louis P. Pojman, 'For the Death Penalty", The Death Penalty: For and Against,
ed. L. P. Pojman and J. Reiman, Oxford, 1998, pp. 1, 7-11; John Rawls, Political
Liberalism, New York, 1993; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, 1971; Jeffrey
Reiman, "Why the Death Penalty Should Be Abolished', The Death Penalty, ed. Pojman
and Reiman, pp. 90-2; Patrick Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, Totowa, 1983; Hans
Saner Kant's Political Thought: Its Origins and Development, trans. H. B. Ashton,
Chicago, 1967; Nancy Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on
Virtue, Cambridge, 1997; Avital Simhony, Was T. H. Green a Utilitarian?' Utilitas,
vii (1995); Michael Slote, From Morality to Virtue, Oxford, 1992; Roger J. Sullivan,
Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 243 f., 361n25; and Howard
Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, Oxford, 1983.
6
 See my 'Corlett on Kant, Hegel, and Retribution', Philosophy, lxxvi (2001);
B. Sharon Byrd, 'Kant's Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in its Threat, Retribution in
its Execution', Law and Philosophy, viii (1989); J. Angelo Corlett, 'Making Sense of
Retributivism', Philosophy, lxxvi (2001); David Cummiskey, Kantian Consequentialism,
Oxford, 1996; David Cummiskey, 'Kantian Consequentialism', Ethics, 1 (1990); Robert P.
George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality, Oxford, 1993, pp.
148-53, esp. 149n39; R. M. Hare, 'Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?' Utilitas, v
(1993); Don Scheid, 'Kant's Retributivism', Ethics, xciii (1983); and Tunick, 'Is Kant
a Retributivist?' Also see A. Phillips Griffiths, 'Kant's Psychological Hedonism',
Philosophy, lxvi (1991); Frederick Neuhouser's editorial footnote at p. 245nl4 in Johann
Gottlieb Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right, ed. F. Neuhouser and trans. M. Baur,
Cambridge, [1795-1796] 2000; and David Weinstein, 'Between Kantianism and
Consequentialism in T. H. Green's Moral Philosophy', Political Studies, xli (1993), esp.
p. 631 where he claims that Green reinterpreted Kant as a consequentialist.
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or some ideal penal theory divorced from empirical concerns.6 In
addition, some interpreters note the different senses in which Kant
discusses punishment, but fail to see his theory of punishment as
coherent.7
My reading uncovers a new problem in Kant's theory of punishment:
How are we to assess the intentional attitudes of criminals in
attributing blame and possible sentencing? The potential difficulty lies
in his pronouncement that we can never know for sure the criminal
culpability of any potential offender, making the possibility of our
punishing innocent people a troubling reality. By assuming a potential
offender's intentional disposition without knowing it for certain, we
further exacerbate the opportunity for misdiagnosis - although the
assumption of individual criminal culpability may be all we can
reasonably be expected to use. While this difficulty is not lost on
Kant, it continues to remain with us today, making Kant's theory of
punishment far more relevant than previously thought.
II. IS KANT'S THEORY OF PUNISHMENT
RETRIBUTIVE?
For Kant, '[t]he law of punishment is a categorical imperative'.8 Being
a categorical imperative, the law of punishment must hold universally
with necessity for all human beings, leaving no one outside the law's
grasp.9 Moreover, there should not be any contradictions amongst
satisfactory legal maxims. If any such contradictions arise, then the
maxims leading to them are unsatisfactory. Thus, laws of punishment
are by extension universal laws that do not allow for any special cases.
The categorical imperative is also known as 'the moral law'. Under
6
 An interesting exception is Williams who claims that Kantian punishments must be
justified from two standpoints: (1) the moral law's retributivism and (2) an empirico-
utilitarianism. Therefore, punishments ought to both fit crimes and deter potential
offenders. (Williams, p. 106; see p. 101.) In addition to Williams, Fleischacker confuses
these two standpoints (Fleischacker, p. 193).
7
 See Jeffrie G. Murphy, 'Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?' Columbia Law
Review, lxxxvii (1987). At 509, Murphy says: 'I am not even sure that Kant develops
anything that deserves to be called a theory of punishment at all. I genuinely wonder if
he has done much more than leave us with a random (and not entirely consistent) set of
remarks'. Holtman attempts to reinvent Kant so she can 'reject the law of retribution
and other disturbing details, but embrace more basic aspects of the accounts of justice
and punishment'. Nevertheless, she says that his theory is at best incomplete. (Holtman,
12, 16, 21; also see Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed.
R. Beiner, Chicago, 1982, pp. 7 f; Stuart Brown, "Has Kant a Philosophy of Law?',
Philosophical Review, lxxi (1962); Fleischacker, p. 193; Saner, p. 2; and Slote, pp. 31-57.)
8
 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. M. J. Gregor, Cambridge, 1996,
p. 105 [6:331].
9
 Necessity arises from a universal duty to respect the moral law. (Kant, Groundwork,
p. 13 [4:400]. See ibid., p. 14n [4:402].)
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the moral law, all laws are to be determined independently of our
desires and inclinations in an effort to ensure universality.10 This
rejection of a subjective standpoint has led most of Kant's critics to
charge his ethical theory with empty formalism, mainly for its having
the appearance of being an ethics based purely on logical criteria.11
For Kant, when we perform a particular action, it is supposed that
we are stating to our community that all may act in the same manner
as we have.12 As an example, if a thief stole property from someone,
the thief s action would effectively establish a universal maxim that
everyone might do the same. Likewise, if a murderer were to kill an
innocent victim, the murderer's action would by extension establish a
universal maxim sanctioning the ability of any citizen to kill innocent
victims. In addition, criminals use other persons as a means to their
own particular ends, in making themselves an exception to universal
principles. This is to say that a thief desires to steal property so that
she might benefit from its ownership: The thief would not like her
belongings stolen from her by a second thief. For Kant, the use of other
human beings as a means to an individual's subjective end for any
reason is morally objectionable.13 The difficulty with theft and murder
- amongst many other crimes - is that they ought not to become
10
 See J. Marina, 'Kant's Derivation of the Formula of the Categorical Imperative:
How to Get it Right', Kant-Studien, lxxxix (1998), pp. 167 f.
11
 Kant says: 'All I need for morality is that freedom does not contradict itself and
hence can at least be thought; I do not need to have any further insight into it' (Kant,
Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Pluhar, p. 30 [B xxix]). See Hare, 11; Fichte, pp. 245 f.
[282-3 § 20 Remark]; Georg Wilhelm Priedrich Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy
of Right, ed. A. W. Wood and trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge, [1820] 1991, pp. 135-40
[§§ 105-12, with Remarks and Additions]; see ibid., p. 43 [§ 9]; Kant, Groundwork, p. 3;
Daniel N. Robinson and Rom Harre, "The Demography of the Kingdom of Ends',
Philosophy, lxix (1994); J. B. Schneewind, 'Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue: An
Overview of Kant's Moral Philosophy", Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. P. Guyer,
Cambridge, 1992; Peter J. Steinberger, 'The Standard View of the Categorical
Imperative', Kant-Studien, xc (1999), pp. 91, 99; and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the
Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge, 1985. Also see Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of
Freedom, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 180-98; Karl Ameriks, 'The Hegelian Critique of
Kantian Morality*, New Essays on Kant, ed. B. den Ouden and M. Moen, New York, 1987;
Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, Ithaca, 1995; P.-C. Lo,
'A Critical Re-evaluation of the Alleged "Empty Formalism" of Kantian Ethics', Ethics,
xli (1981); Onora O'Neill, Acting on Principle, New York, 1975; Jeffrey Edwards, 'Egoism
and Formalism in the Development of Kant's Moral Philosophy", Kant-Studien, xci
(2000); and Christian J. Onof, 'A Framework for the Derivation and Reconstruction of
the Categorical Imperative', Kant-Studien, lxxxix (1998).
12
 Often, this is solely attributed to Hegel. See Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy
of Right, pp. 49 [§ 15 Addition], 113 [§ 81, Remark], 115 f. [§ 82, Addition], 124 f. [§ 99,
Remark], 126 f. [§ 100, Remark], and 131 f. [§ 104]. See also ibid., pp. 117 f. [§ 86,
Addition] and 104 [§ 73].
13
 See Kant, Groundwork, pp. 37-40 [4:428-32]. We should not forget that 'morality
is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in itself, since only
through this is it possible to be a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends' (ibid., p. 42
[4:435]).
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universal actions, as it would undermine rights to ownership, liberty,
and, most importantly, the moral law.14 As lawbreakers have wrong-
fully subjected the law-abiding public to harmful actions, Kant
believes that it is only just to then subject the former to the harmful
maxims they attempted to impose on their community.15
This part of Kant's moral theory is seldom disputed. The difficulty
is in accurately interpreting the justifications he offers to support
the right of the state to punish these criminals for their crimes. The
most popular understanding is that Kant's theory of punishment is
a retributivist theory, not a utilitarian nor a consequentialist theory.
Indeed, Kant's political writings contain several criticisms of the use
of punishment as a kind of tool to realize future goals.16 As an example,
Kantian punishments must always treat human beings as ends-in-
themselves and never as a means to some future goal: 'Punishment by
a court (poena forensis) ... can never be inflicted merely as a means to
promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society. It
must always be inflicted upon him only because he has committed a
crime'.11 Punishments are to be administered solely on the basis of
criminal guilt, not on consideration of social utility.18 In addition, the
particular form a punishment takes is to be specified by the kind and
severity of crime committed. Therefore, a punishment's form should
not be influenced by extraneous concerns.
One of the most oft-cited passages of Kant's in favour of the view
that he justifies punishment purely on retributive grounds is his 'blood
guilt' example in The Metaphysics of Morals:
Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all its members
(e.g., if a people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse
throughout the world), the last murderer remaining in prison would first have
to be executed, so that each has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood
guilt does not cling to the people for not having insisted upon this punishment;
14
 Kant's moral theory would not tolerate all universal maxims, such as 'destroy
human life whenever you please', as the respect for persons must remain primary as a
rule. This would contradict Hare's reading. However, Hare is quite correct to point that
'[m]oral principles do not have to be as simple and general as Kant seems to have
thought, and they can still be universal all the same' (see Hare, 'Could Kant Have Been
a Utilitarian?' pp. 7 f.).
15
 See my 'Corlett on Kant, Hegel, and Retribution', p. 563.
16
 'But to look upon all punishments and rewards as mere machinery in the hands of
a higher power, serving only to put rational beings into activity toward their final
purpose (happiness) is so patently a mechanism which does away with the freedom of
the will that it need not detain us here' (Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, ed. and
trans. M. J. Gregor, Cambridge, [1788] 1997, p. 35 [5:38] and Kant, Practical Philosophy,
ed. and trans. M. J. Gregor, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 170 f). See Kant's essay 'The End
of All Things' in Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, ed. A. Wood and
G. di Giovanni, Cambridge, 1998, p. 204 [8:338-9].
17
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 105 [6:331].
18
 Likewise, rule-utilitarians can justify punishments without being retributive.
Kant's Theory of Punishment 211
for otherwise the people can be regarded as collaborators in this public
violation of justice.19
While all other debts might or might not be forgiven and all other
contracts perhaps left unfulfilled, it is only with the punishing of
criminals where we are commanded to treat them strictly and
severely. The importance Kant gives to punishing violations of justice
is no minor concern, for 'if justice goes, there is no longer any value in
human beings living on the earth'.20 In fact, some of our value as
persons is partly derived from our sacred defence of justice in human
community.
Not to be overlooked, Kant's theory of punishment is often linked
with the lex talionis: 'whatever undeserved evil you inflict upon
another within the people, you inflict upon yourself. If you insult him,
you insult yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself; if
you strike him, you strike yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself.'21
Indeed, with regard to executing murderers, Kant in fact argues
for 'the strict law of retribution' in '[t]his fitting of punishment to
the crime'.22 This is justified on the grounds that strict justice is not
objectionable in the least when the criminal's inner wickedness is
particularly noticeable.23 It must be said that it is rather difficult to
reconcile Kant's motto of equity ('the strictest right is the greatest
wrong') with this insistence that all murderers are to be killed as
punishment for killing someone else.24 Nevertheless, what is critical
for Kant in justifying capital punishment for murderers is the
murderers' demonstration of inner wickedness.
19
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 106 [6:333]. It is easy to forget that we also have a
duty to forgive fellow human beings, which at times may result in abandoning the
distribution of punishments to culpable violators of moral and positive law (ibid.,
p. 208 [6:461]).
20
 Ibid., p. 105 [6:332]. Hegel thinks just the opposite: 'Let justice be done' should not
have as its consequence 'even if the world should perish' (Hegel, Elements of the
Philosophy of Right, p. 157 [§ 130]).
21
 Ibid. See Kant, Lectures on Ethics, ed. P. Heath and J. B. Schneewind, trans.
P. Heath, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 310 f. [§ 49 27:555]. (I am citing a passage from
Johann Friedrich Vigilantius's notes from Kant's 1793-4 lecture course entitled "The
Metaphysics of Morals'.) Eugen Duhring argued that the lex talionis satisfied too low a
penal threshold, as to properly negate an offending will one must cause more harm to
the criminal than he or she committed to make up the shortfall of his or her 'lack of
regard for others shown by that will in the crime' (Small, 42). At times Kant seems to
be somewhat sympathetic to this approach: "Every deed that violates a human being's
right deserves punishment, the function of which is to avenge a crime on the one who
committed it (not merely to make good the harm that was done)' (Kant, Metaphysics of
Morals, p. 207 [6:460]).
22
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 106 [6:332].
23
 Ibid., pp. 106 f. [6:333]. Other interesting examples involve Kant's suggested
punishments for rape, pederasty, and bestiality (ibid., p. 130 [6:363]).
24
 Ibid., p. 27 [6:235].
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Perhaps because of its discord with modern notions of morality, one
aspect of Kantian punishment that is little mentioned in the literature
is the fact that, for Kant, punishment is a physical harm, properly
understood.25 Psychological punishments or non-painful punishments
are not seriously considered for most crimes.26 In fact, the physical
infliction of punishment upon a criminal is a necessary consequence
in the allocation of justice, even if the criminal transgression
precipitating the punishment is not naturally connected with moral
wickedness.27 In a sense, the criminal 'pays' for the crime she
committed by experiencing a certain amount of, potentially lethal,
pain.28 This is not to imply that Kant was some kind of sadist - to be
clear, he was certainly not.29 In fact, he finds public rewards offered
by the government to be 'more in harmony with morality' than
punishments.30
I do not believe that this evidence is enough to justify labelling Kant
a retributivist, for his theory seems to also go in another direction: He
is quite explicit in stating that governments can and do only impose
deterrent punishments.31 For Kant, governments are concerned pri-
marily with pragmatic matters, rather than with matters of justice,
all things considered. One example that has been ignored by nearly
all commentators is the fact that in certain instances no punishment
should be inflicted, even where the guilty parties deserve to be
punished.32 In the 'Doctrine of Right', Kant supposes that we have
before us murderers and their accomplices. He tells us that the
idea of judicial legal authority dictates that all of these persons must
be executed, in accordance with universal laws - the categorical
imperative regarding punishment. Nevertheless, Kant asserts that
25
 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 34 [5:37] and Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans.
Heath, pp. 79 [27:286], 304 [§ 38 27:547], 308 f. [§§ 43-4 27:552 f.], 312 [§ 50 27:556].
(From the Lectures, the first citation is from the section 'Of Rewards and Punishments'
from Georg Ludwig Collins's 1784 notes. The following citations are Vigilantius's notes.)
26
 There is an exception for crimes where the appropriate manner of punishing
criminals is to levy fines. Moreover, wealthy criminals who will not be 'hurt' by the fine
are to be publicly embarrassed, perhaps a form of psychological punishment. (Kant,
Metaphysics of Morals, p. 106 [6:332].)
27
 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 34 f. [5:37] and Kant, Metaphysics of Morals,
p. 104 [6:331].
28
 See Tom Sorell, Moral Theory and Capital Punishment, Oxford, 1987, p. 134.
29
 'No punishment should be coupled with cruelty" Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans.
Heath, p. 311 [§ 49 27:556].
30
 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. L. Infield, Indianapolis, 1963, p. 57.
31
 Ibid., p. 55 and Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Heath, p. 79 [27:286] in the section
'Of Rewards and Punishments'. See the section entitled 'Of the Lawgiver' in ibid., p. 79
[27:286]. (Both are from the notes of G. L. Collins.) This statement mirrors Fichte's belief
that the purpose of punishment is solely to deter. (See Fichte, pp. 226-48 [260-85 § 20].)
32
 I know of only three treatments: Byrd, 196, 196nl44; Scheid, 268-71; and Tunick,
63. Corlett takes this view only with regard to his own reinterpretation of a Kantian
penal theory (Corlett, 78, 78n7).
Kant's Theory of Punishment 213
should the number of criminals be so great a number that the state
would be left without any subjects if they were all executed, 'the
sovereign must also have it in his power, in this case of necessity (casus
necessitatis), to assume the role of judge (to represent him) and
pronounce a judgement that decrees for the criminals a sentence other
than capital punishment, such as deportation, which still preserves
the population'.33
In this example, the preservation of the community outweighs
retributive concerns when administering particular punishments -
in violation of much of what form punishment ought to take as a
categorical imperative.
Kant's use of the sovereign offers another example that does not
support a retributivist reading. First, he declares that 'the presently
existing legislative authority ought to be obeyed, whatever its origin',
even though this authority may be completely at odds with reason
or morality.34 People would then be forced to live according to laws
that may violate universality, for instance. In addition, citizens have
no rights to sedition or rebellion - even if the sovereign abuses his
authority. Any attempt to do either is high treason, punishable
by state execution.35 Kant says: '[l]ike a chasm that irretrievably
swallows everything, the execution of a monarch seems to be a crime
from which the people cannot be absolved, for it is as if the state
commits suicide'.36 Finally, not only is the sovereign immune from legal
punishment as king, but even if he should be dethroned, he cannot be
punished for any actions he performed while a sovereign.37
Even when reiterating his commitment to the lex talionis, Kant
tells us that punishments ought to be less severe than the criminal
deserves when the punishment would be a crime against humanity:
Those convicted of rape or pederasty should be castrated, those of
bestiality expelled from the community for life, etc.38 His argument is
that we may forgo punishing to the letter of the law, so long as the
penalty we choose is commensurable to its spirit.39
33
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 107 [6:334].
34
 Ibid., p. 95 [6:319]. Should a citizen resist the rule of his sovereign, she Nvould be
punished, got rid of, or expelled in accordance with the laws of this authority, that is,
with every right' (ibid.).
35
 Ibid., p. 96 [6:320]. He says further: 'It is the formal execution of a monarch that
strikes horror in a soul filled with the idea of human beings' rights, a horror that one
feels repeatedly as soon as and as often as one thinks of such scenes as the fate of
Charles I or Louis XVI' (ibid., p. 97n [6:320]).
36
 Ibid., pp. 97n-98n [6:320] (emphasis added). As 'the people' are implicated in a
crime most, if any at all, did not participate in in any way, Kant sanctions yet again the
violation of a universal maxim.
37
 Ibid., pp. 95, 98 [6:319, 323].
38
 Ibid., p. 130 [6:363].
39
 Ibid.
214 Thorn Brooks
The most well-known example of Kant's which appears to justify the
primacy of consequentialist above retributive concerns regards two
shipwrecked men fighting over a raft that will only hold one of them.40
Should one of them push the other off the raft - drowning him - in
order to save his own life, the surviving man is 'to be morally con-
demned but not legally punished'.41 Kant's reason is explicit:
the punishment threatened by the law could not be greater than the loss of his
own life. A penal law of this sort could not have the effect intended, since a
threat of an ill that is still uncertain (death by a judicial verdict) cannot
outweigh the fear of an ill that is certain (drowning). Hence the deed of saving
one's life by violence is not to be judged inculpable (inculpabile) but only
unpunishable (impunible).42
The surviving person is to be relieved of legal punishment in part
due to his fulfilling a duty to preserve his own life.48 In addition, the
surviving person avoids punishment only because punishing him
would not have the desired effect that punishments ought to have,
derived from 'threat'. Kant argues also against punishing mothers who
kill their illegitimate children and soldiers who murder each other in
duels on the same grounds: These persons ought not to be punished for
doing so would not deter others in committing the same actions in the
future.44
At first glance, it might appear as if Kant lacks a coherent theory
of punishment. As is well known, in some instances Kant seems to
be concerned solely with retributive justifications for punishing and
for particular punishments. For example, recall the illustration of the
island community about to dissolve with a murderer left in its prison:
The community must execute the murderer for the sake of justice or
otherwise the community shares in the murderer's guilt. Almost to the
contrary, I have shown that there are many other instances where
Kant seems to justify punishing criminals solely upon consequentialist
grounds, where if persons cannot be deterred by the threat of punish-
ment, they ought not to be punished at all. I would propose that the
apparent contradiction is due mostly to a misreading of Kant, for when
40
 See Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 28 [6:235 f.].
41
 I take this phrase from Tunick, 65.
42
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 28 [6:235 f.] (emphasis given). See Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Kant: The Philosophy of Right, London, 1970, p. 130n3.
43
 Kant, Groundwork, p. 11 [4:397]. Fleischacker argues that in this example 'Kant
does not hold that the impossibility of deterring someone morally justifies not punishing
him; on the contrary, he stresses the fact that deterrence concerns only the subjective
(empirical), not the objective value of punishment' (Fleischacker, 194). The problem with
this view is that Fleischacker has misrepresented Kant's penology by not taking into
consideration that punishment is itself an empirical practice - and, for Kant, govern-
ments can only administer deterrent punishments.
44
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 108 f. [6:336 £].
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Kant is writing in favour of one version of punishment rather than
another he is doing so in very different contexts.
III. TWO SPHERES OF LAW
For Kant, there is a dichotomy of juridical (i.e. positive) law and moral
law. Juridical laws concern themselves solely with external actions
and their conformity to a government's legislation - which may or may
not be rational.46 In order to follow a juridical law we must act solely
in accordance with written legislation governing a human community.
In so doing, our actions may be perfectly legal but not always com-
mensurable with standards set by morality. Juridical laws require
incentives other than moral duty, as this form of duty is an internal
incentive.46 As an example, Kant says: 'It is an external duty to keep
a promise made in a contract; but the command to do this merely
because it is a duty, without regard for any other incentive, belongs to
internal lawgiving alone'.47
When we act from duty alone, we act with respect to morality and
the moral law. Acting otherwise is primarily a matter for juridical
law.48
As we have seen previously, for Kant, the moral law is first and
foremost expressed in the categorical imperative.49 This imperative
commands us to act only in such a way that our maxim - expressed by
our action - can be a universal law.50 As rational beings, we act within
a 'kingdom of ends' whereby we subject ourselves to universal laws
at one and the same time as we perform particular actions.51 Most
importantly, this law becomes the standard by which we may judge the
moral correctness of every particular action. Before we perform any
action we must first consider — consciously or unconsciously — the
45
 See Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 14, 17 [6:220, 224]. As positive laws may be
irrational, Kant's argument against the right to sedition or rebellion against the state
may be problematic (see ibid., pp. 96 f. [6:320]). In addition, human beings are only ends
in themselves in morality, not in positive law (Kant, Groundwork, p. 42 [4:435]). This is
not to say that Kant's project of a kingdom of ends is complete fantasy, for one of the
primary foundations of a kingdom of ends is its possible realization through human
conduct (ibid., p. 44n [4:437]). Kant hints that there would be no need for punishment in
the ideal society (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K Smith, London, 1963,
A317/B373; see Fleischacker, 191 and Fichte, 244 [§ 20 282V(f.)]).
46
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 20 [6:219]. See ibid., p. 23 [6:230].
47
 Ibid., p. 21 [6:220].
48
 See ibid., p. 20 [6:219].
49
 Ibid., p. 15 [6:222-3]. See ibid., p. 19 [6:227] and Kant, Groundwork, pp. 5 [4:392];
30-3 [4:420-4] and 39 f. [4:430-2].
50
 Kant, Groundwork, pp. 15 [4:402], 16 [4:403], and 31 [4:421].
51
 Ibid., pp. 41 [4:432] and 42 [4:434]. See ibid., p. 40 [4:432].
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effect on society should all its members adopt the maxim on which we
are intending to act. For example, if we were to consider lying, stealing,
or committing a murder, we are to reject this behaviour on the grounds
that everyone might lie, steal, or murder each other, bringing about a
world without trust or promises, protection of property, or basic human
liberty. By acting in accordance with morality, a human being can fully
exist as an end-in-itself, 'since only through this is it possible to be a
lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends'.52
Were we to punish criminals from this purely moral perspective,
it would be essential that we justify punishment primarily as an act
of justice: 'this constitutes what is essential in this concept [of
punishment]'.63 In other words, punishment must be primarily com-
mensurable with justice in order for it to be distributed to a particular
person. Therefore, all punishments ought to be given only to the guilty
and within certain limits. With regard to the violation of moral
laws, Kant is clearly in favour of retributive measures of punishing
criminals. On the other hand, from the standpoint of juridical, or
positive, law, Kant is concerned primarily with deterrence-based justi-
fications for punishment. This crucial dichotomy is rarely appreciated
by commentators on Kant's political philosophy.54
It is important to note that this matter - which he called a
'quandary' - was not left unnoticed by Kant, for he says:
The knot can be undone in the following way: the categorical imperative of
penal justice remains (unlawful killing of another must be punished by death);
but the legislation itself (and consequently also the civil constitution), as long
as it remains barbarous and undeveloped, is responsible for the discrepancy
between the incentives of honour in the people (subjectively) and the measures
that are (objectively) suitable for its purpose. So the public justice arising from
the state becomes an injustice from the perspective of the justice arising from
the people.55
52
 Ibid., p. 42 [4:435]. See ibid., p. 15 [4:403] and Kant, Metaphysics of Morals,
p. 182 [6:429].
53
 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 34 [5:37].
54
 See Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 17, 20 [6:219, 225] and 10, noted. The
best treatment of Kant's theory of punishment is Tunick, 60-78, esp. 77 f. A fairly
similar dichotomy is present in Hegel (see Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right,
p. 121 [§ 94 Addition]). Also see Hare, 11 and Kant, Groundwork, pp. 57 [4:452] and
61 [4:457].
55
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 109 [6:336-7]. See Allen W. Wood, Kant's Ethical
Thought, Cambridge, 1999, p. 322: 'Kant holds that we have a moral obligation to limit
ourselves to actions that are right [R], but that duty is no part of R itself.
R grounds only juridical duties, which are distinguished from ethical duties by the fact
that their concept contains no determinate incentive for complying with them'. Unfor-
tunately, there is no discussion of the role(s) of moral and juridical duties regarding
punishment. (Ibid., p. 407n32 and Allen W. Wood, 'Kant's Practical Philosophy',
Cambridge Companion to German Idealism, ed. Karl Ameriks, Cambridge, 2000.)
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From the standpoint of the moral law, the positive law may well be
inadequate. Indeed, we might best evaluate juridical law via moral
law. However, this is just one standpoint. The other standpoint is that
of the state which deals with practical matters of external actions,
which it must try to influence. In practical concerns, such as state
legislation, justice is served only when the letter of the law is observed.
For Kant, the best of all possible human communities will be one that
fully develops itself when it perfectly unifies the spheres of juridical
and moral law.
This noble ideal was not a reality in Kant's time nor is it true
today. Human societies will remain in a 'barbarous and undeveloped'
condition until they are able to commensurate juridical and moral law.
Thus, our attempts to determine the most just punishment for a
particular crime begin in an undeveloped condition, where the conse-
quential effects of a punishment take priority over the satisfaction of
purely retributive demands. We may improve our attempts over time
by greater incorporation of retributive standards into our theory of
punishment. Crucially, while the form a punishment takes may
eventually begin to prioritize retribution over consequences, punish-
ment takes a consequentialist form at first, as it attempts to shape
external human behaviour. Punishing criminal conduct strictly in
accordance with what the moral law dictates is the ultimate aim of the
practice, but not where we begin.66
Kant states in his 1792 letter to Johann Benjamin Erhard:
In a world of moral principles governed by God, punishments would be
categorically necessary (insofar as transgressions occur). But in a world of
moral principles governed by men, the necessity of punishments is only
hypothetical, and that direct union of the concept of transgression with the
idea of deserving punishment serves the ruler only as a prescription for what
to do. So you are right in saying that the poena meremoralis ['ethical penalty*]
(which perhaps came to be called vindicativa ['avenging punishment'] for the
reason that it preserves the divine justice), even if its goal is merely medicinal
for the criminal and the setting of an example for others, is indeed a symbol of
something deserving punishment, as far as the condition of its authorization
is concerned.57
In this passage, Kant agrees with Ernst Ferdinand Klein that
'punishment is the symbol of an action's deserving punishment, by
56
 For example, Kant tells us that the legal system he is describing is that of 'the
state in idea, as it ought to be in accordance with pure principles of right' (Kant,
Metaphysics of Morals, p. 90 [§ 45 6:313]).
67
 Kant, Kant: Philosophical Correspondence, 1756-99, ed. and trans. A. Zweig,
Chicago, 1967, p. 199 [11:398-9] and Kant, Correspondence, ed. and trans. A. Zweig,
Cambridge, 1999, p. 448. See Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 24-7, 104-6 [6:231-4,
331 f.]. Fleischacker cites only the first half of this letter, which may have further
contributed to his misinterpretation of it (Fleischacker, 204).
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means of a mortification of the criminal that corresponds to the crime
committed'.68 More importantly, Kant agrees with the interpretation
of his penal theory being offered, as he admits that 'the necessity of
punishments is only hypothetical' with regard to 'a world of moral
principles governed by men'. Rather than justifying punishments
completely devoid of retributive concerns, Kant argues instead that
these concerns ought to be considered as 'a prescription for what to
do'. Thus, Kant tempers a consequentialist theory of punishment by
moulding punishment in a shape that would fulfil retributive stan-
dards.69 However, this matter is one of retributive concerns helping to
form what is primarily consequentialist punishment and not vice
versa.
Furthermore, I would like to suggest that when Kant speaks of
sovereigns60 'performing injustice in the highest degree' when offering
pardons or reduced sentences to criminals, the injustice in question is
moral, not juridical.61 Such a matter is related solely to the moral law
existing internally in human beings, which we can discern barely
and with much difficulty. From the standpoint of juridical law the
sovereign who offers pardons acts justly if this pardon positively
colours certain consequences. In fact, it would be a grave injustice if a
sovereign did not pardon criminals where carrying out their sentence
would lead to the breakdown of the community.62
58
 See Kant, Kant: Philosophical Correspondence, p. 199n3. Kant says of Klein on
criminal right: 'Most of what he says is excellent and quite in accord with my own view'
(ibid., p. 199).
59
 As he says in the letter to Erhard, the authorization of punishment is dependent
upon retributive justification (esp. its concept of desert), subsumed under a primarily
consequentialist theory of punishment.
60
 Kant's use of 'sovereign' is a term easy to confuse. In the Groundwork, the
'sovereign' is each rational being in the kingdom of ends: 'He belongs to it as sovereign
when, as lawgiving, he is not subject to the will of any other' (Kant, Groundwork, p. 41
[4:433]). However, in Metaphysics of Morals, the sovereign is a single person who alone
rules over his community (Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 95-8 [6:319-23]). I believe
that 'sovereign' in the first sense is related to individual autonomy and in the second it
is related to a particular individual (i.e. a monarch).
61
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 109 [6:337]. See Don Becker, 'Kant's Moral and
Political Philosophy*, Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. 6, The Age of German
Idealism, ed. R. C. Solomon and K. M. Higgins, London, 1993, p. 84.1 believe that Jeffrie
Murphy was mistaken in declaring that Kant held no such view, as Kant says:
'conformity with juridical laws is the legality of an action and conformity with ethical
laws is its morality' (Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 14 [6:220] and 17 [6:225]; see
Jeffrie G. Murphy, 'Kant's Concept of A [sic] Right Action', Kant Studies Today, ed. Lewis
W. Beck, La Salle, 1969, pp. 471-95).
62
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 107 [6:334]. To recall Kant's 'blood guilt' example,
it would then seem to follow that the last murderer in prison might not be executed upon
the dissolution of his island community if the community's preservation is no longer at
issue: When its preservation may collapse, alternative penal remedies are justified to
continue the community.
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IV. THE PROBLEM OF INTENTIONALITY
While they are subject to the particular laws of their place of residence,
Kant believes that human beings ought to follow the moral law at all
times.63 The moral law is not some Utopian ideal we might aspire to,
yet never fulfil. Instead, the significance given to the moral law via
reason is that 'the moral law is solely practical', its realization by
human beings is a true possibility and not a product of wishful
thinking.64 It is the moral law which determines the concept of right
and wrong, as a standard by which we fine-tune legislation to unite as
closely as possible juridical law with the moral law.65
Rather confusingly, Kant suggests that when we violate the moral
law our transgression deserves punishment.66 In this way, Kant speaks
of 'punishment (poena)' resulting from the moral law (the categorical
imperative)'s violation as 'the rightful effect'.61 Specifically, the 'rightful
effect' is 'what is culpable is punishment'.68 This matter might be
understood in one of two ways. One interpretation is that persons who
violate the moral law ought to be punished for their violation -
punishment is the 'rightful effect' - but these persons may avoid being
punished because they have not violated the juridical law. The diffi-
culty with this view is that it makes Kant's proposition that criminals
should be punished on the basis of mens rea appear contradictory.69
63
 See Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 35 f. [5:38], 70 f. [5:82-4] and 79 [5:93];
Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 9 [6:215].
64
 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 44 [5:50]. See ibid., pp. 33, 74 [5:37, 86-7];
Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 42 f. [6:252-3]; Kant, 'On the Proverb: That May be
True in Theory, But Is of No Practical Use', Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics,
History, and Moral Practice, ed. T. Humphrey, Indianapolis, 1983, p. 71.
65
 See Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 54 [5:63]; Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans.
Heath, pp. 73 f. [27:279] ('De Littera Legis'), 80 [27:287] ('Of Rewards and Punishments'),
83 [27:291] ('Of Degrees of Imputation'); and Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 16 [6:223
f.]. (All citations from Kant's Lectures are from the notes of G. L. Collins.) See also Kant's
discussion of public right at Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 89 [6:311]; 'On a Supposed
Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns', p. 165 [429]. In Kant, Ethical
Philosophy, 2nd edn., ed. and trans. J. W. Ellington, Indianapolis, 1994: in the move
'from a metaphysics of right (which abstracts from all empirical determinations) to a
principle of politics (which applies these [metaphysical] concepts [of right] to instances
provided by experience' we 'gain the solution of a problem of politics in accordance with
the universal principle of right'. (Brackets supplied by Ellington.)
66
 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 34 [5:37]. In 'Of Rewards and Punishments',
Kant says: 'Punishment in general is the physical evil visited upon a person for moral
evil'. (See Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Heath, p. 79 [27:286]. See pp. 308 [§ 43 27:552]
('In punishments, a physical evil is coupled to moral badness'), 309 [§ 44 27:553].)
67
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 19 [6:227] (emphasis given). See Kant, Lectures on
Ethics, trans. Heath, pp. 76 [27:282], 80 f. [27:288], and 306 [§ 40 27:549].
68
 Ibid.
69
 As an example, see ibid., pp. 106 f. [6:333].
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On the other hand, I believe that this problem is best understood
as an argument for the importance of intentionality for Kant in the
attribution of punishments. This is a new and crucial problem in
coming to grips with Kant's theory of punishment. Kant insists: 'the
state of mind of the subject, whether he committed the deed in a state
of agitation or with cool deliberation, makes a difference in imputa-
tion, which has results'.70 This state of mind - the person's will - is
what 'always takes first place in estimating the total worth of our
actions and constitutes the condition of all the rest'.71 Whatever action
we perform is granted some level of moral worth from the com-
mensurability this action has with the maxim employed when
justifying the particular action. The purpose, or consequence, pursued
is irrelevant for consideration.72
When we legally punish, we ought to appraise not only the crime
committed, but the 'inner wickedness' of the criminal when performing
an offence.73 While juridical laws bear on the external actions of
persons independent of the reasons for acting - as moral laws are
concerned with the state of mind and decision-making process of
human beings — a person's intentional (i.e. culpable) disposition when
performing actions which violate the positive law is an important
factor in attributing punishable guilt.74 Individuals who deliberately
breach these laws are more culpable for their criminal action(s) than
those who do so unintentionally.75
Of course, we should not always assume that a criminal's inten-
tionality is united in his criminal action(s), for only in certain
instances are the two fully connected.76 On some occasions, actions
may become criminal due to unintended consequences. This gap
between the perceived (our physical movements) and the unperceived
(the state of our moral disposition) marks the difficulty of this project
of calibrating punishments to persons solely regarding their moral
guilt.77 It is precisely this gap between the two which needs to be better
70
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 20 [6:228].
71
 Kant, Groundwork, p. 10 [4:397].
72
 Ibid., p. 13 [4:399 fj. See ibid., p. 14 [4:401].
73
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 106 f. [6:333].
74
 See Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Heath, p. 74 [27:280] in the section 'De Littera
Legis'.
75
 I am referring to the common legal distinctions ofactus reus and mens rea and their
often critical importance in attributing punishments to criminals.
76
 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 108 [6:335]. See Kant, Groundwork, pp. 13
[4:399 £] and 19 f. [4:407].
77
 It should also be kept in mind that the calibration of juridical law towards encom-
passing moral law is not a project to be completed overnight. This process may well take
generations. (See Kant, 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent', Kant,
Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, Akademie p. 19.)
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understood if we are to impart criminal guilt and/or penalties to
criminals due, at least in part, to their intentional disposition.78
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant says:
The real morality of actions, their merit or guilt, even that of our own conduct,
thus remains entirely hidden from us. Our imputations can refer only to the
empirical character. How much of this character is ascribable to the pure effect
of freedom, how much to mere nature, that is, to faults of temperament for
which there is no responsibility, or to its happy constitution (merito fortunae),
can never be determined, and upon it therefore no perfectly just judgements
can be passed.79
He states elsewhere: 'In fact, it is absolutely impossible by means of
experience to make out with complete certainty a single case in which
the maxim of an action otherwise in conformity with duty rested
simply on moral grounds and on the representation of one's duty5.80
Morality is poised at the very boundary of human knowledge:
'reason would overstep all its bounds if it took upon itself to explain
how reason can be practical'.81 What Kant fails to sufficiently consider
is the fact that the moral law's true content - which we have no
knowledge of - might actually vary greatly with his theory of moral
law.
While Kant denies that we could ever know for sure whether or
not a person was morally motivated, the moral law can only have
authority over our wills when it is possible for us to be motivated by
it:82 for 'what counts is not actions, which one sees, but those inner
principles of actions that one does not see'.88 Simply put, the essential
78
 As Kant says, 'Right [justice] must never be adapted to politics; rather, politics must
always be adapted to right' (Kant, Ethical Philosophy, p. 166 [429]). See Kant, Lectures
on Ethics, trans. Heath, p. 306 [§40 27:550]. The fact that most interpretations of Kant's
theory of punishment have not found such a gap previously ought then to be seen as one
instance in which many were misled.
79
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith, p. 475n [A552/B580] (emphasis
added). See Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory, p. 243.
80
 Kant, Groundwork, p. 19 [4:407]. Due to our inability of knowing dispositions with
any certainty, T. H. Green criticizes Kant for continuing to include intentionality in his
theory of punishment. Green does what he believes Kant ought to have done: base his
theory of punishment on more consequentialist grounds. (See Thomas Hill Green,
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, London, [1882] 1941, pp. 180-205
[sections 176-206] and my 'T. H. Green's Theory of Punishment', History of Political
Thought (forthcoming).)
81
 Kant, Groundwork, p. 62 [4:458-9]. Kant says: We see this as soon as we become
convinced that there is a use of pure reason which is practical and absolutely necessary
(viz., its moral use). When used practically, pure reason inevitably expands and reaches
beyond the bounds of sensibility* (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Pluhar, p. 27
[B xxv]; see Katrin Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy, Cambridge, 2000,
p. 194).
82
 I paraphrase Korsgaard, 'Introduction', p. xxi.
83
 Kant, Groundwork, p. 20 [4:407]. Nevertheless, this state of affairs does not stop
Kant from stating that: 'the pure thought of duty and in general of the moral law, mixed
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good in an action 'consists in the disposition'.84 Accordingly, judges
will have little recourse other than to 'construe the criminal's act as
intending] to express a universal law even though it probably in
fact results from an irrational maxim'.85 If we are to attribute penal
sanctions on the basis of criminal intent - never sure if we are correct
- then it may well be that Kant's theory of punishment would justify
the legal punishment (and possible execution) of innocent persons.86
Kant admits, 'only the moral relations of human beings to human
beings are comprehensible to us' as an empirical phenomenon.87 This
statement underlies the dilemma at hand. At the very least, neither
Kant nor many of ourselves would be satisfied with a system of
juridical law which lacked coherence and broad notions of justice, in
particular. Yet, the shape which coherence and notions of justice ought
to take are quite difficult to ascertain. My reading understands Kant
to agree with this view and further argue that we are able to work out
ideal notions of justice via theoretical tools, such as the categorical
imperative. The problem is how best to incorporate this ideality with
the empirical world in which we live. It is beyond the scope of this
article to identify an acceptable account of intentionality; suffice to say
that while Kant does not rule out the impossibility of such a project, he
is aware of its difficulty. This has not lost its strength since Kant's
with no foreign addition of empirical inducements, has by way of reason alone an
influence on the human heart so much more powerful than all other incentives, which
may be summoned from the empirical field' (ibid., pp. 22 f. [4:410-11]).
84
 Ibid., p. 27 [4:416].
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 See Fleischacker, 202. Fleischacker believes that the Kantian judge 'appears to be
a rather strange human being, and indeed it is not clear that he is, in his formal role, a
human being at all' (ibid., p. 203). Also see where Kant says: 'Rewards and punishments
are merely subjective motivating grounds; if objective grounds no longer avail, the
subjective serve merely to replace the want of morality" (Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans.
Heath, p. 80 [27:287]; see p. 284 [§ 24 27:522]; Manfred Kuehn, Kant: A Biography,
Cambridge, 2001, p. 41; and George, p. 149n39).
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 This is not to say that Kant would find it desirable to punish innocent persons, for,
in fact, the moral law prohibits this from happening. I would argue that the attempt to
administer punishments only to guilty persons is one example of how consequentialist
punishments are to be tempered by dictates of rational morality to the best degree
possible (and for good reason). However, the inability to always (or mostly) positively
identify one's moral disposition when breaching juridical laws plausibly opens the door
wide to mistaking unintended consequences for criminal culpability. Thus, the Kantian
believes the innocent man being punished is innocent, whereas the 'naive utilitarian'
knows the person to be punished is innocent and punishes him anyway. (See my
'Gilligan on Deterrence and the Death Penalty: Has Legal Punishment Failed Us?',
Ethics and Justice, iii/iv (2001/2002); my "Utilitarianism, Capital Punishment, and
Innocent Persons: A Defense of Bentham', Review Journal of Philosophy and Social
Science, special issue, xxvii (2002); and Fred Rosen, 'Utilitarianism and the Punishment
of the Innocent: The Origins of a False Doctrine', Utilitas, ix (1997). On 'naive utili-
tarianism', see my 'Corlett on Kant, Hegel, and Retribution', pp. 578-80.)
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 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 232 [6:491].
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time, as it would appear that just about every project seeking to unify
moral law and positive law faces just this dilemma.
V. CONCLUSION
Interpretations of Kant's theory of punishment have been hampered
by the inability of commentators to distinguish properly between
Kant's distinction between juridical and moral law. Kant is not
retributivist at a primary level and then open to considerations of
social utility at a secondary level, affixing specific punishments to
particular criminals. Instead, when Kant is arguing on behalf of
retributive or deterrent-based justifications he does so from different
standpoints. The retributive Kant is concerned with transgressions
of the moral law, the consequentialist Kant with juridical law. Indeed,
it is easy to confuse the two as Kant does seem to take into account
moral culpability when determining the severity of punishment for
criminals.
Some commentators, such as Kevin Thompson, are wary of any
conflation of moral and positive law: 'the very spheres Kant wished to
separate'.88 On the contrary, I believe that Kant is 'searching for a way
to unite the moral law with empirical institutions of justice'.89 Kant's
penal consequentialism is tempered by its aspiring desire to conform to
the moral law, a project severely curtailed by our inability to know
with certainty the actual content of morality aside from a reasonable
estimation.90 This is particularly troublesome as we are supposed to
impart punishments to criminals commensurable with their criminal
culpability. To compound this problem, by advocating in advance the
moral measure to which potential criminals will be held to prior to
actual events, Kant's theory of punishment may well impugn penalties
to undeserving persons.
Rather than this being a weakness of Kant's theory of punishment,
Kant demonstrates instead the weakness of all such theories where
criminal culpability is central to the determination of justice. Our
inability of knowing with certainty a person's disposition when
committing an act is a reality, but not a hindrance. We decide criminal
guilt according to standards such as 'beyond a reasonable doubt'. The
link between intentions, actions, and criminal culpability remains in
88
 Kevin Thompson, 'Kant's Transcendental Deduction of Political Authority*, Kant-
Studien, xcii (2001), 78.
89
 Lindstedt, 133.
90
 I am therefore at odds with Hare's assertion that Kant 'was a sort of utilitarian,
namely a rational-will utilitarian', although I am generally sympathetic with Hare's
analysis (Hare, 4).
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modern jurisprudence despite our lack of certainty in identifying
dispositions with absolute certainty. Thus, Kant's problem remains
a contemporary dilemma and not an issue of purely historical
importance.91
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